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Residential mortgage products (also known as home loans) pricing has been long 
understood to be something of a „dark art‟, requiring judgment and experience, rather than 
being an exact science. In the last decade, a lot has changed in this field and more and 
more lenders, primarily the larger lenders, are increasingly looking to make their pricing as 
exact as possible. Even so, inadequate pricing of residential mortgage products (in particular 
its substandard risk pricing) has been seen as one of major causes of the global financial 
crisis (GFC) and subsequent spectacular banking collapses. The underlying theme of the 
paper is to exhibit how contemporary lenders, in practice, price their residential mortgage 
products. While discussing elements of the pricing calculation particular attention was given 
to the exposition of how contemporary lenders price risks involved in providing home loans. 
Because of the importance of Basel capital accords to how financial institutions assess and 
quantify their risks, the paper provides an overview of Basel capital accords. The author 
envisages that the paper will (i) help enhance comprehension of the underlying elements of 
the pricing calculation and the ways in which these elements relate to each other, (ii) 
scrutinize how contemporary lenders identify and quantify risks and (iii) improve 
consciousness of future changes in interest rates. 
 
Keywords: Home loan pricing, Home loan products, Basel capital accords, Cost plus pricing 
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Introduction 
The Australian home loan industry is characterised by a very homogenous products offering, 
a strong risk-pricing discipline, a highly concentrated industry structure, and products (home 
loans) that are almost fully commoditised1. In 1997, Beyond Commodity Status, the Council 
on Financial Competition‟s syndicated study, identified the following three hallmarks of 
commoditisation in the retail financial services industry leading to rapid industry 
consolidation: (i) increasing price elasticity of individual borrowers, (ii) pressure on profit 
margins across the core product set, and (iii) strategic emphasis on cost reduction. 
 
When discussing pricing, it is important to have in mind that pricing is only one element of 
the marketing mix and, as such, must be assessed as part of a wider picture. The other 
marketing mix elements are distribution, process, product and promotion. Activities such as 
the introduction of a new product or new distribution channel are generally very costly, and 
the impact of these types of changes will generally take some time to start making a 
difference. In contrast, the impact of pricing-related initiatives is, typically, almost 
instantaneous. For example, a change in price for fixed rate home loans (FRHLs) would 
impact on all new home loan sales, while a change in price for variable rate home loans 
would have an impact on the whole portfolio. Of course, in a real life situation, all of the 
marketing mix functions need to work together cooperatively i.e. pricing without promotion 
and adequate product mix and process cannot produce much in isolation. Nevertheless, 
relative to other less competitive and homogenous industries, home loan borrowers are 
typically more price sensitive, which makes pricing more relevant and more often used by 
lenders as a driving force for various marketing initiatives. 
                                               
1
 For more on home loan products see Karamujic (2009), Chapter 5. 
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Overall, home loan pricing entails pricing interest rates and fees2. Fee pricing, in general, is 
much more static and by and large significantly smaller contributor to the overall price. 
Consequently, the focus of this paper will be on home loan interest rates pricing. 
 
More precisely, the paper aims to show how lenders price their home loans i.e. determine 
home loan interest rates. While discussing elements of the pricing calculation, particular 
attention was given to how contemporary lenders identify and quantify risks. The author 
believes that with a bit of adjustment a very similar approach can be adopted by other 
disciplines (such as property), which currently employ significantly less sophisticated 
methods of risk assessment and risk quantification. In addition to discussing home loan 
pricing in the next section, in Section III we will present an overview of Basel capital accords. 
Finally, in Section IV, the paper concludes.  
 
Home Loan Pricing 
A study conducted by Council on Financial Competition (2005) showed that the majority of 
lenders have, historically, devoted few or no resources to developing sound pricing models. 
This may be due to the fact that home loan product pricing has been long understood to be 
something of a „dark art‟, requiring judgment and experience, rather than being an exact 
science. In the last decade, a lot has changed in this field and more and more lenders, 
primarily the larger lenders, are increasingly looking to make their pricing as exact as 
possible. Their attempts are supported by Council on Financial Competition (2003) research, 
which shows that lenders who use quantitative pricing techniques as part of their pricing 
process can boost their bottom-line earnings by as much as five to seven per cent. In doing 
so, lenders have a number of pricing techniques at their disposal: 
 
1 Cost plus Pricing, 
2 Market Pricing, 
3 Promotions Pricing, 
4 Tiered Pricing, 
5 Timing Pricing, 
6 Relationship Pricing, 
7 Product Range Pricing, and 
8 Premium Pricing 
 
The cost plus pricing technique sets prices at a mark-up to a minimum price allowable. The 
paper focuses on cost plus pricing technique because it is the basis for all other pricing 
techniques i.e. all other pricing techniques discuss different margin (mark-up) combinations, 
which primarily depend on the lender‟s business goals and associated pricing strategies3.  
 
Cost-plus Pricing Technique 
The underlying motivation of the cost plus pricing technique is to determine the minimum 
cost of providing a home loan. On the critical side, even well constructed cost plus pricing 
totally ignores the question of demand and provides only an acceptable price floor. Within 
this framework, if we are to set the lender‟s margin to equal the return on equity at the 
lender‟s hurdle rate (minimum rate of return on lenders‟ equity acceptable to the lender), the 
analysis represents the break-even analysis. This analysis does not take into account factors 
such as the competitive landscape and a borrower‟s value to the lender. Nevertheless, it 
                                               
2
 Such as transaction fees, lending fees (application and monthly service fees) and sundry fees (such 
as reference fees and bank cheque fees). 
3 
For more on other pricing techniques refer to Karamujic (2009), Chapter 6. 
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provides a useful tool for determining product level profitability. Furthermore, the technique 
can be very useful in quantifying losses from products offered below cost to ensure they are 
being recouped elsewhere. For example, a lender may offer basic products well below the 
break-even point with the understanding that profits from cross-sold products will 
compensate for the loss. In this case, basic products serve as “loss leaders”. 
The basic cost plus pricing technique can be expressed as: 
Hbp = COF + LLP + LM + COS +COC,   (1) 
where Hbp represents home loan baseline price, COF represents cost of funds, LLP 
represents loan loss provision charge, LM represents the lender‟s margin, COS represents 
costs of sales, and COC represents corporate overhead costs4. 
 
Cost of Funds (COF) 
An internal banking term interchangeably used with COF is the funds transfer pricing rate 
(FTPR). It is important to note that financial markets, although dominant, are not the only 
source of funds. Even though a certain proportion of lending will be funded by deposits held 
by the lender, for pricing purposes the lender‟s benchmark base yield curve (BBYC) is 
represented by a weighted average of funds sourced from financial markets, across the 
required maturity spectrum. 
 
As its name states, the FTPR is devised, among other things, to enable meaningful funds 
transfer between different business units (normally between the treasury and various retailer 
business units, generally divided in line with the lender‟s borrower segmentation). The total 
FTPR across all defined maturity points is comprised of the BBYC and product-based risk 
adjustments. 
FTPR = BBYC + RAs,     (2) 
where RAs represents risk adjustments. 
 
There may be instances, permanent or temporary, where it is necessary to make 
adjustments to the BBYC rate using an RA in order to transfer any risk associated with 
particular products or to reflect changes to the lender‟s overall relationship to the BBYC. RAs 
will normally occur for reasons of liquidity risk and optionality risk. The risk premiums 
generated by the risk transfer processes must be explicitly set for each product and their 
appropriateness must be monitored. Any RAs adopted by a lender must be supported by an 
appropriate analysis and approved by the lender‟s management prior to implementation. 
 
To ensure the liquidity risk is adequately reflected through the fund transfer pricing process, 
a liquidity premium should be added to the BBYC. This is mainly influenced by the premium 
price in financial markets for longer-term funds5, financial markets valuation of the lender‟s 
creditworthiness6 and/or periodic changes in global capital flows7. Overall, liquidity risk can 
be defined as financial risk due to uncertain liquidity. Lenders‟ treasury departments are 
                                               
4
 An interesting example how simplified version of the calculation can be utilised is provided by 
Kosonen (1997). 
5
 There is „natural‟ interest rate premium in financial markets for longer term funds. 
6
 According to Moody (2010), its creditworthiness analysis focuses on the fundamental factors of 
lender‟s long and short term risk profile: “The foundation of Moody's methodology rests on two basic 
questions: (i) what is the risk to the debtholder of not receiving timely payment of principal and interest 
on this specific debt security?, and (ii) how does the level of risk compare with that of all other debt 
securities?”  
7 
Such as the one triggered by  the GFC.  According to Ellis (2009) the following three are the major 
causes of the GFC: the misperception and mismanagement of risk; the level of interest rates; and the 
regulation of the financial system. 
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generally the ones that assess the best representative spread to the BBYC, at all maturity 
points, and that apply liquidity premiums across the BBYC at the appropriate points. For all 
products, the liquidity premium must be based on the contractual maturity as opposed to the 
term to the next repricing. The liquidity spread to the BBYC is normally reviewed annually. 
 
By allowing a product-related option to be embedded in product change schedules of the lending 
contract, the lender faces an additional interest rate risk. The two most common examples of 
optionality entailed within a home loan product are: early repayment or prepayment, and 
repricing. An example of early repayment optionality is when a borrower has the implicit or 
explicit ability to terminate all or part of a “fixed term” home loan contract without incurring the 
payment of economic cost
8
. This would definitely impact on the pricing base and hence the 
optionality risk has to be calculated and added as an RA. A repricing optionality arises when, for 
example, a borrower is given the option to reprice a product (i.e. change the interest rate) at 
specified time intervals. 
 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
Loan loss provisioning (LLP) is a part of the cost structure of providing a home loan that 
encompasses all the risks associated to providing lending products, except those related to 
liquidity and optionality. The lender‟s home loan LLP is comprised of the following two 
components: (i) a specific provisioning cost (risk costs associated to cycle related long-term 
losses) and, (ii) a general provisioning cost (related to risk costs of losses already present 
within the portfolio but not yet specifically identified). 
  
As with any other cost that the lender faces, the aim is to minimise these risk costs, subject 
to provisioning a sufficient amount of capital that enables the lender to cover possible losses 
for activities that entail an element of risk. The LLP cost is typically the second largest home 
loan pricing calculation cost element, hence the lenders are very keen to do everything they 
can to reduce the cost of achieving capital adequacy (the implicit logic is that the higher the 
risk involved, the greater the capital backing required). Therefore, the lender‟s aim is optimal 
provisioning, which, if achieved, would contribute to total cost reduction. Equally, sub-optimal 
provisioning will most definitely increase total costs of operations and thus the cost of 
providing home loans.  
 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), as its name states, is the prudential 
regulator of the financial services industry in Australia. Its primary task is to oversee banks, 
credit unions, building societies, general insurance and reinsurance companies, life 
insurance companies and friendly societies. In respect of provisioning, APRA (2010) 
specifies that Australian Deposit Taking Institutions (ADIs) that are predominantly banks:  
 
“Should have sound provisioning policies to ensure asset values, earnings and capital 
are accurately reported. An ADI's provisioning policy should cover both specific and 
general provisions. Specific provisions should be raised whenever reasonable doubt 
exists over the recoverability of particular exposures. General provisions cover the 
risks which are inherent in an ADI‟s business but which cannot be attributed to 
particular exposures.” 
 
The expertise of risk quantification, relating to the LLP, is based on the concepts of expected 
losses (EL) and unexpected losses (UL). The notion of specific provisioning relates to the 
concept of ELs, while the notion of general provisioning relates to the concept of ULs. 
Principally, at a portfolio level, specific provisioning relates to average write-offs of the 
particular class of home loan being priced. For example, if home loan write-offs and post 
recoveries reached 10 per cent once every ten years, and were at 0 per cent for the other 
nine years, the gross specific provision charge should be one per cent (being a simple 
                                               
8 
Economic cost  is a fee that is charged by the lender for the early termination of the fixed rate home 
loan contract. 
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average over the observed period) of the outstanding amount  (the total amount owed to the 
lender, at the particular point in time) for the particular class of home loans considered. On 
an individual (account) basis, specific provisioning is the estimate of shortfall between the 
face value of the debt and the estimated future cash flows, including the estimated realisable 
value of securities, if any. Therefore, to get the gross specific provisioning amount for an 
individual home loan, we need to multiply the loan-specific EL rate and the outstanding 
home loan amount. 
 
There are two main methods used for specific provisioning for home loan products, namely the 
term product methodology and the revolving product methodology. The term product 
methodology applies to all home loans except line of credit (LOC) home loans. The term product 
methodology (ELterm) is defined as: 
 ELterm = EAD x NLRterm,            (3) 
where EADterm represents exposure at default and NLRterm the net loss rate. The EAD is 
defined as the amount of outstanding principal, fees and interest owed at the time of default. 
On the other hand, the NLR is an expected cumulative net loss rate for the remainder of the 
loan term, and is calculated as: 
NLR = GLR x (1- rcr),     (4) 
where GLR is a gross loss rate (estimated from the actual data and based on historically 
observed loss rates) and rcr is the portfolio level estimate of the recovery rate.  
Contrary to the term product methodology, the revolving product methodology (ELrpm) 
applies only to LOC home loans and is calculated as follows: 
ELrpm = EAD x PD x LGD,    (5) 
where PD represents the probability of default (the probability that a loan or group of loans 
will become irreversibly delinquent over a prescribe period of time) and LGD represents loss 
given default (percentage of exposure which will be lost after all recovery efforts, including 
legal expenses, time value of money and recovery expenses). The LGD is calculated as: 
LGD = 1 – rcr.     (6) 
As previously mentioned, in contrast to specific provisioning, general provisioning is derived 
to cover losses already present within the portfolio, but not yet specifically identified. In the 
most general terms, APRA (2010) views general provisions in the following terms: 
 
“A general provision should be established to address latent losses known to exist in 
the credit portfolio but which cannot be ascribed to individual facilities. When creating 
and determining the level of general provisions, an ADI should consider the following: 
 
(a) the general provision should not act as a substitute for the establishment of 
adequate specific provisions or the recording of an appropriate charge-off for bad 
debts; 
 
(b) the general provision should be calculated in a prudent and conservative, but not 
excessive manner, so that it addresses an acceptable range of estimated losses; and 
 
(c) the estimate of latent credit losses known to exist in the credit portfolio should 
reflect consideration of all significant factors that affect the collectibility of the credit 
portfolio as of the assessment date.” 
 
Due to its importance to the stability of the financial system, APRA is very vocal in stating 
that where it assesses that the level of general and/or specific provisions generated by an 
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ADI‟s own methodology is not adequately reflecting loss expectations in the credit portfolio, 
nor correctly measuring impaired assets, earnings or capital adequacy, it will discuss these 
concerns with the ADI. Following discussions between an ADI and APRA, the ADI may be 
required to adjust its level of general and/or specific provisions and/or amend its provisioning 
methodologies. 
 
Notionally speaking, general provisioning can be catered for by using two methods, namely 
risk capital9 method and regulatory capital10 method. In its pure form the total of credit risk11, 
market risk12, operational risk13, interest rate risk in the banking book14 and business risk15 
capital is referred to as “risk capital”. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, the risk 
capital represents a calculation of the capital required to act as a buffer against UL for credit, 
market and operational risks, at a prescribed minimum confidence level. Furthermore, to 
simplify the analysis and because the focus of our attention are home loans, for which the 
credit risk typically represents the largest risk, we assume that market and operational risks 
are not present. Consequently, the risk capital is equal to the credit risk capital. The total of 
risk capital plus pension risk16, dividends and intangibles17 capital is referred to as 
“Economic Capital”. 
 
According to the risk capital methodology, the UL amount is the loss of the worst-case 
scenario, more specifically, the difference between the worst-case scenario loss and the 
mean. To notionally illustrate the risk capital methodology let us use the same example as 
before i.e. assume home loans that lose, post recovery, 10 per cent once every ten years, 
and 0 per cent in the other nine years, within the same estimated risk exposure environment. 
As previously determined, the specific provision charge would be one per cent. Furthermore, 
if we are to assume that the lender is aiming to have a 100 per cent confidence interval, i.e. 
to be fully covered, it would need to cover for the 90 per cent interval of the residual gap 
between the worst-case scenario loss (10 per cent) and the mean loss (1 per cent). With the 
worst-case scenario loss being 10 per cent and the mean loss being one per cent, the UL 
amount would be 9 per cent. Consequently, the product level gross amount of risk capital 
required is 9 per cent multiplied by the outstanding loan amount. 
 
In practice, the confidence interval is directly related to the lender‟s credit rating. For 
example, the National Australia Bank‟s (NAB‟s) current credit rating of AA implies that the 
bank-wide capital should go to a 99.97 per cent worst-case scenario, allowing a probability 
                                               
9 
The term risk capital method is purposely used to differentiate from the regulatory capital method. 
Other commonly used, and probably more precise, term to depict this method is “calculation of the 
regulatory capital in accordance to the Basel II‟s internal ratings-based (IRB) approach”. 
10 
Also known as “calculation  of the regulatory capital in accordance to Basel I or the Basel II‟s 
standardized approach”. 
11
 The risk arising from a borrower‟s failure to meet the term of any contract with the lender or 
otherwise fail to perform as agreed. 
12
 The risk arising from adverse market movement in the Trading Book which arises from money 
market dealing and position 
13
 The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events. 
14
 The risk arising from adverse movements in interest rates on the structural interest rate position in 
the banking book. 
15
 The risk to earnings and capital arising from the lender‟s exposure to potential operating losses 
following an unexpected reduction in revenue that cannot be offset by a corresponding timely 
decrease in expenses. 
16 
The risk that assets are insufficient to meet the lender‟s legal and moral obligations to the current 
and former members of the relevant pension schemes. 
17
 In addition to capital to support the inherent risks, the applicable solvency standards require holding 
of sufficient capital to meet shareholder dividend payouts and intangibles such as unamortised 
goodwill, asset revaluation reserves, future income tax benefits and capitalised expenses. 
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of only 0.03 per cent of the historical worst-case scenario not being covered. In this view, 
capital represents the amount needed as a cushion against hard times. 
 
Formally, the calculation of UL amount (also known as the gross risk capital amount 
(GRCA)) can be defined as the standard deviation of the default expectancy of a loan: 
GRCA = UL = (EL x (LGD – EL))1/2    (7) 
and 
EL = PD x LGD      (8) 
Thus, to calculate the UL amount for a single exposure (ULamt) we use 
GRCA amt = ULamt = EAD x ULi,    (10) 
where ULi is the rate of UL for a single exposure.  
 
At a portfolio level, the calculation of UL portfolio amount (ULp) is conducted over the 
aggregated exposure, given the approach assumes a portfolio level PD. Thus: 
 
GRCA p = ULp = EADp x ULp      (11) 
 
Following calculation of portfolio-level ULp, to calculate UL for all portfolios (ULpo), we need 
to correlate ULp to the total lender‟s portfolio loan loss likelihood.  
GRCApo =  ULpo = ULp x √Corr     (12) 
Finally, the GRCApo at the required confidence level (GRCArcl) is calculated by multiplying 
the correlated ULpo amount by the appropriate number of standard deviations of the required 
confidence level. 
 GRCArcl = ULpo x nsd,      (13) 
where nsd stands for number of standard deviations. 
 
After deriving the GRCA, to get the net risk capital amount (NRCA) we need to subtract the 
capital benefit (the revenue earned from investing the allocated provisioning capital, as 
APRA allows limited usage of the allocated capital) amount from the GRCA. Finally, the risk 
capital charge amount (RCCA) equals the NRCA multiplied by the lender‟s hurdle rate18.  
 
As previously indicated, an alternative way of calculating the UL amount is by using the 
regulatory capital method. The regulatory capital method aims to cater for the same reasons 
of capital adequacy as the risk capital method, however instead of primarily being 
determined by the lender‟s risk profile, it is set in isolation of the lender‟s risk profile by the 
regulatory authority, in Australia by APRA. In doing so, APRA arrives at the single minimum 
amount of capital the lender is required to hold, applicable to the particular lending class 
(such as the secured and unsecured lending classes). This minimum amount of capital is 
defined by the Capital Adequacy Accord, agreed to in 1988 (also known as Basel I). 
According to Basel I, the lender must hold capital that is no less than 8 per cent of risk-
weighted assets. Credit exposures are risk-weighted according to the three broad types of 
counterparty (government, banks and all others). The Accord specifies five general 
                                               
18
 The hurdle rate can be defined as the minimum returns on regulatory or economic capital expected 
to be achieved to provide a sufficient return for the use of the lender‟s capital. Achieving returns equal 
to, or above, the hurdle rate means that shareholder value is being created. 
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categories of risk weights: 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 per cent. The sum of risk-weighted assets 
plus risk assessed from off balance-sheet business is then related to the lender‟s capital 
base. The resulting risk ratio is used as a measure of capital adequacy. In respect to the 
capital allowed to be used for the capital adequacy provision, for supervisory purposes, the 
allowed capital can be disaggregated into two tiers, namely Tier 1 (T1)  and Tier 2 (T2) 
capital. T1 capital is comprised of the highest quality capital and includes: paid-up ordinary 
shares, non-repayable share premium accounts, general reserves, retained earnings, 
noncumulative irredeemable preference shares and minority interests in subsidiaries. On the 
other hand, T2 capital represents other capital, which falls short of some of the 
characteristics of the core capital. Based on differing degrees of permanence associated 
with the respective capital instruments, T2 capital can be divided into two further tranches. 
Upper T2 capital is comprised of general provision for doubtful debts, asset revaluation 
reserves, cumulative irredeemable preference shares, perpetual subordinated debt and 
mandatory convertible notes. Lower T2 capital is ranked behind upper T2 capital and entails 
limited life redeemable preference shares and term subordinated debt. 
 
To calculate the gross regulatory capital amount (GRGCA) for a particular exposure we need 
to multiply the outstanding amount of the loan by at least 8 per cent, and adjust it with the 
applicable risk weighting. The net regulatory capital amount (NRGCA) is equal to the 
GRGCA less the capital benefit amount (the revenue earned from investing the allocated 
provisioning capital, as APRA allows limited usage of the allocated capital). Finally, to get 
the regulatory capital charge amount (RGCCA) we need to multiply the NRGCA by the 
lender‟s hurdle rate. 
 
Ultimately, the total LLP charge (this amount is to be inputted into Equation (1)) entails the 
general provisioning (the UL cost charge, expressed as loan amount per centage of either 
RCCA or RGCCA) cost per-centage charge and the specific provisioning cost (EL) per-
centage charge. In closing, it is important to note that since home loans (being secured 
lending products) generally have better risk profile compared to other lending products, the 
risk capital method (being based on an internal assessment of risk) is the method most 
home lenders would prefer to use.  
 
Lender’s Margin 
The lender‟s interest rate margin can be defined, in principle, as the difference between the 
interest rates on lenders‟ borrowings and their lending rates The lender‟s margin can be 
viewed as either gross or net margins. The gross margin is the difference between the COFs 
and the lending interest rate, and the net margin is the difference between the gross margin 




Other costs, as presented in Equation (1), include the costs of sales (COS) and corporate 
overhead costs (COC). COS are comprised of home loan distribution, payment and 
processing costs. During the tenure of a home loan, lenders incur significant COC for 
activities such as general analysis, risk-related overview and analysis, etc. As a result, a 




A Simplified Example - the Cost plus Pricing Technique 
Let us now put all of that wonderful exposition into a simplified practical example, and look at 
recent history to see how the various components of the Cost plus Pricing technique (in 
particular LLP and COF) drove typical home loan interest rates at the time. 
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Cost Of Funds (COF) 
1
 549 566 596 642 781 325 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
2
 97 94 89 68 74 120 
Lenders Margin (LM) 
3
 273 282 271 262 263 217 
Cost Of Sales ( COS) 
4
 5 5 5 5 5 5 




5 5 5 5 5 5 
Interest Rate 929 951 966 981 1,128 672 
Table 1: An Example - the Cost plus Pricing Technique 
 
Assumptions 
1. Represented by 90 days bank bills interest rate. Sourced from RBA (2010). 
2. The total nominal lending provisions as a percentage of the total gross loans and advances. Sourced from 
APRA (2010b), Table 5. 
3. The total nominal retained profits as a percentage of the total assets. Sourced from APRA (2010b), Table 5. 
4. COS and COC are predominantly fix costs. They are estimated at 5 bps each across the observed period. 
 
As shown in Table 1, the loan pricing landscape underwent some dramatic changes 
between 2004 and 2009. In particular: 
(i) COF continued increasing until 2008 and then as a consequence of RBA‟s response to 
the GFC (from September 2008 to April 2009, the RBA reduced the cash rate by 4.25 per 
cent) experienced a significant fall,  
(ii) LLPs continued falling until the emergence of the GFC (the market had largely forgotten 
about the concept of risk), which resulted in a sharp increase in provisioning (increased by 
77 per cent, from June 2007 to June 2009), and  
(iii) LMs were quite stable for the most of the observed period, with the exception of sizable 
fall recorded in 2009 as a consequence of the GFC (tightening of the wholesales markets 
forced funding costs up, while heightened risk aversion induced lenders to fight harder for 
lower risk opportunities). 
 
An Insight Into the Future  
As we look to the future, the price makeup will change again and may look as shown in 
Table 2.  
 
 (bps) - basis points November 2010 June 2011 June 2012 
Cost Of Funds (COF) 
1
 420 480 500 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
2
 110 110 100 
Lenders Margin ( LM) 
3
 210 250 270 
Cost Of Sales ( COS) 
4
 5 5 5 
Corporate Overheads ( COC) 
4
 5 5 5 
Interest Rate 750 850 880 
Table 2: Possible Future Changes in Typical Mortgage Lending Interest Rate 
 
Assumptions 
1. COF represented by 180 days bank bills interest rate as of March 2010. In line with the shape of the capital 
markets yield curve; we expect moderate increases in COF for both 2011 and 2012. 
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2. As financial markets stabilize and banking risk profiles improve, conservatively we expect provisioning cost to 
reduce by 10 bps in 2010, stay unchanged in 2011, and then also reduce by additional 10 bps in 2012. 
3. With stabilization of wholesale credit markets and ongoing improvement in domestic economic performance, 
lending margins are expected to improve. We forecasted for ongoing improvements during the observed period, 
and return to long run average by 2012. 
4. COS and COC are predominantly fix costs. They are estimated at 5 bps each across the observed period. 
 
Perhaps of most interest in gaining some insight into the future direction of interest rates is to 
look at which of the key drivers‟ discussed above are going to have prominent influences 
over the next few years. In regards to future movements in typical home loan interest rates we 
expect: 
 
(i) a modest upward push driven by expected increase in COFs and LMs, and  
(ii) partly offsetting downward push due to eventual reduction in LLPs. 
 
An Overview of Basel Capital Accords 
Main objectives of Basel Capital Accords are to promote safety and soundness in the 
financial institutions by ensuring maintenance of sufficient capital levels, supporting 
development and implementation of adequate policies and processes, and ensure 
continuance of robust governance practices to safeguard against all types of risk. The name 
„Basel‟ comes from the Swiss city of Basel, which is where the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) developed the original framework, known as Basel I. 
  
Principally, the development of Basel I came about in response to concerns by bank 
regulators that some banks, especially internationally active banks, did not properly 
understand risk and thus posed a systemic risk to the global banking system. The Accord 
was initially intended to only apply to banks in the world's richest ten countries, nevertheless 
the Accord was eventually adopted by almost every country in the world. 
 
In short, Basel I aimed to ensure a standard level of banking safety and security by requiring 
institutions to have sufficient capital to cover their risks. The Accord was introduced in 1988 
and is also known as the Capital Adequacy Accord of 1988. It prescribes the holding of core 
T1 of no less than 4 per cent of risk-weighted assets (with common equity (CE), also known 
as core T1 capital ratio, of 2 per cent), and total regulatory capital (TRC) of no less than 8 
per cent of risk-weighted assets19. Major critiques of Basel I are that it focus on credit risk 
and that the bulk of a bank's assets are subject to the same capital charges, no matter how 
risky they are. 
 
As the international financial system has grown more sophisticated and complex, the initial 
Accord‟s focus on credit risk has become insufficient. Subsequent events led to a recognition 
that more sophisticated standards are required to take into account industry advances and, 
as a result, the BIS began to review the Basel I framework. The regime was refined and 
made more sophisticated, and the risk weightings more granular, in 2004 with Basel II. For 
example, it allowed banks with the appropriate systems and historical data to use an internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach to assess the risks of a particular lending20. On the other 
hand, the Basel II‟s standardised approach continued using Basel I practice of setting 
specific risk weights for certain types of credit risk. The risk weight categories prescribed 
under the standardised approach are the same as those used under Basel 1 with an addition 
of new 150% rating, which is allocated for borrowers with poor credit ratings. 
                                               
19 
Applicable risk weight are: 0% for short term government bonds, 20% for exposures to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries‟  banks, 50% 
for residential mortgages and 100% weighting on other personal and unsecured commercial loans. 
20
 The Basel II Accord comprises of three interrelated segments that are known as the "three pillars". 
For more on the three Basel II pillars and different Basel II approaches see BIS (2006). 
 
Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building 
 
Karamujic, H M (2010) ‘An investigation into the fundamental drivers of pricing of residential mortgage products – A 
risk pricing viewpoint’, Australasian Journal of Construction Economics and Building, 10 (4) 60-72  
70 
The overall objective of the Basel II was to promote safety and soundness in financial 
institutions by ensuring the maintenance of sufficient capital levels, along with supporting 
policies and processes and robust governance practices to safeguard against credit, 
operational, market and interest rate risks. By allowing lenders to match their capital to the 
level of risk, the Basel II led to more pragmatic and competitive pricing outcomes.  
 
Nevertheless, over time it became obvious that Basel II has several major shortcomings, 
namely: (i) it became an international competition for consultants: how to help banks allocate 
less capital, (ii) it was accused of boosting procyclicality of the banking industry21, (iii) it 
created significant incentives for banks to move risky assets to unregulated parts of the 
holding company, and (iii) banks took advantage of the opportunity to transfer risk to 
investors - use securitization22.  
 
The analytical portion of the paper focuses on the two presently established accords: Basel I 
and Basel II. Those regulatory frameworks represent decades-long effort at perfecting 
minimum capital requirements calculations. Unfortunately, as recent events clearly indicate, 
those rules have not proved as useful in preventing bank illiquidity as a result of the GFC. 
For example, just five days before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it 
boasted a Basel-type T1 capital ratio of 11 per cent; significantly above the regulatory 
minimum. When the share price collapsed, counter-party confidence ebbed away much 
faster than the capital adequacy ratio would suggest.  
 
At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the 
oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial 
strengthening of existing capital requirements. This proposal has been dubbed “Basel III”.  
According to the Basel III proposal, the total risk capital (TRC) can be presented as: 
 
TRC =  T1 + T2 + CB + CCB + CSIB   (14) 
 
where T1 represents Tier 1 capital, T2 represents Tier 2 capital, CB represents capital 
conservation buffer, CCB represents countercyclical capital buffer, and CSIB represents 
capital for systemically important banks. On the other hand, the T1 is comprised of common 
equity (CE) and other T1 (OT1). 
 
 T1 = CE + OT1       (15) 
 
Possibly the most important change that comes with Basel III is setting of much stricter 
minimum standards for CE. Something similar did exist in the past, but it was set very low, at 
just 2 per cent. Compared to Basel I and Basel II, according to Basel III, CE is the main thing 
that matters. Furthermore, various dubious things which currently count as T1 or T2 capital, 
but should not, will be phased out over a period of 10 years, beginning in 2013. According to 
the proposal, the minimum requirement for CE is 4.5 per cent, for OT1 is 1.5 per cent and for 
T2 is 2 per cent. On the whole, the new standards for CE are significantly tougher than the 
old standards for T1 capital in total. 
 
In addition to strengthening CE requirements, there is a CB of another 2.5 per cent. Most, if 
not all banks, should strive to be well above that buffer. If there‟s some kind of crisis and 
banks are forced to write down a lot of bad loans, they can eat into the buffer. That will bring 
extra regulatory oversight, and those banks won‟t be able to pay dividends. Assuming full 
allocation of CE, banks will need to have 7 per cent CE, 1.5 per cent OT1, and 2 per cent 
T2, i.e. 10.5 per cent TRC. 
                                               
21 For more see Imad (2010) , and Gordy and Howells (2004). 
22 To see how it functioned in Ireland see Coates (2008). 
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Furthermore, when credit in an economy is growing faster than the economy itself, a CCB 
comes in play. Principally, CCB requires banks to hold more capital in good times. This 
countercyclical capital framework is intended to contribute to a more stable banking system, 
which will help dampen economic and financial shocks. That countercyclical buffer won‟t be 
set by the BIS; it will be left up to national regulators. According to preliminary comments 
made in media, one can probably expect OECD countries to enforce it up to the maximum of 
2.5 per cent. In view of that when the economy‟s is doing well, banks are going to need 9.5 
per cent CE, 1.5 per cent OT1, and 2 per cent T2, i.e. 13 per cent TRC. 
 
Finally, according to BIS (2010) “Systemically important banks should have loss absorbing 
capacity beyond the standards announced…”. It still not know how high CSIB will be, but the 
chances are that when an announcement comes, the biggest banks are going to need 
significantly more capital. Work continues on this issue in the BIS‟s Financial Stability Board and 
relevant Basel Committee work streams.  
 
It is important to note that the above outlined impacts will not be implemented immediately, 
instead the standards start being phased in on January 1, 2013, with a CE requirement of 
3.5 per cent. That rises to the final 4.5 per cent in 2015. Other parts of the structure take 
longer, but they‟re all phased in by January 1, 2019. 
 
With respect to commenting on the proposal, at least at this early stage, the following 
statements made by the ATCA (2010) make a lot of sense “…the fact that the proposals are 
dubbed Basel III suggests that regulators have been here twice before! The record of bank-
capital rules is crushingly bad in the wake of new types of securitisation instruments, 
excessive risk taking, self-measurement of risk and financial markets' volatility… In the days 
when banks could not rely on governments to save them, they carried huge capital buffers to 
protect themselves against losses and drops in confidence. In the late 19th century a typical 
American or European bank had an equity buffer, i.e. core capital, equivalent to 15-25% of 
its assets! As recently as the 1960s British banks held more than a quarter of their assets in 
low-risk, liquid form, such as cash or government bonds. Are we in the end -- if not via Basel 
III then Basel IV -- likely to return to 19th century levels of capital adequacy? This would no 
doubt have significant consequences for the valuation of banks and the unencumbered 
survival of large capital financial institutions.” 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to expound how, in practice, lenders price their home 
loans, i.e. how they determine their home loan interest rates. The paper started by outlining 
the importance of home loan pricing, its major components and objectives. The cost plus 
pricing technique was then examined. Particular attention was given to the cost plus pricing 
technique because it is the basis for all other pricing techniques i.e. all other pricing 
techniques only focus on different margin (mark-up) combinations. Having gone through a 
rather detailed discussion of how contemporary lenders identify and quantify risks, the 
inevitable conclusion is that a lot that has been outlined, with some modifications, can also 
be used to enhance the ways other disciplines, such as construction and property, assess, 
quantify and price their risks. Due to a number of references made to it while discussing 
LLP, the paper provided an overview of Basel capital accords. Given the debates about the 
housing market that have been raging since the GFC, the eventual impacts of the proposed 
Basel III, as the newly proposed measures are phased in, will be very closely monitored. 
After more information becomes available, an interesting possibility for further 
research would be to assess the impact of the implementation of Basel III on LLP costs and 
home loan interest rates. Overall, the author hopes that the paper will help demystify the 
underlying elements of the pricing calculations (such as COFs and LLPs) and the ways in which 
these elements relate to each other. Consequently, the paper should also contribute towards 
better understanding of the likelihood and probability of future changes in home loan interest 
rates. 
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